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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This appeal requires us once again to determine, in the 
wake of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the 
constitutionality of a statute criminalizing an activity that is 
not directly linked to interstate commerce. The precise 
question before us is whether it was within Congress's 
power under the Commerce Clause to enact 18 U.S.C. 
S 2252(a)(4)(B), which imposes criminal liability on 
individuals who possess child pornography that has not 
itself traveled in interstate commerce as long as one of the 
materials from which the pornography was created--in this 
case, Polaroid film--has so traveled. 
 
Unlike the statute in question in Lopez, this statute has 
a jurisdictional element or "hook"--that is, a clause that 
purports to ensure that the law only covers activity that 
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. We 
conclude, however, that the jurisdictional element in 
S 2252(a)(4)(B) does not achieve this goal. Accordingly, we 
must consider whether Congress could reasonably have 
believed that the intrastate possession of child pornography 
that has been made using products that traveled interstate 
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has a substantial effect on the interstate commerce in child 
pornography. 
 
Although we are not without misgivings in view of the 
breadth of the regulation at issue, we conclude that 
Congress rationally could have believed that intrastate 
possession of pornography has substantial effects on 
interstate commerce. Intrastate possession likely fosters the 
possessor's demand for additional child pornography, some 
of which will come from interstate sources. Hence, 
discouraging the intrastate possession of pornography will 
cause some of these child pornographers to leave the realm 
of child pornography completely, which in turn will reduce 
the interstate demand for pornography--the very activity 
Congress wished to suppress through regulation. This point 
is buttressed by the fact that Congress has historically 
regulated interstate commerce in child pornography, and 
that Congress hoped to close a remaining loophole in the 
law by criminalizing intrastate possession of the same. We 
therefore will affirm the judgment of the District Court 
convicting Rodia under S 2252(a)(4)(B). 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
In 1991, local law enforcement officials in New Jersey 
arrested Joseph Rodia and filed state charges against him, 
including attempted aggravated sexual assault, endangering 
the welfare of a child, and manufacturing child 
pornography. After a New Jersey grand jury indicted Rodia 
on these charges, he fled and was eventually arrested in 
Ohio for sexually assaulting a child there. After pleading 
guilty to two counts of endangering the welfare of a child, 
he received a four-year sentence. While serving that 
sentence in Ohio, federal law enforcement officials brought 
a charge against him in the District Court for the District 
of New Jersey, alleging a violation of the Child Restoration 
and Penalties Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. S 2252 ("CRPA"), 
which criminalizes the possession of child pornography 
when the pornography has traveled in interstate commerce 
or when the materials from which the pornography was 
created traveled in interstate commerce. The material 
creating the purported jurisdictional hook in this case was 
the Polaroid film with which Rodia's pornographic 
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photographs were taken. It is undisputed that Polaroid film 
has never been manufactured in New Jersey and that it 
was transported there via interstate commerce. 
Before trial, Rodia moved to dismiss the federal 
indictment on the ground that Congress had exceeded its 
powers under the Commerce Clause in enacting the second 
clause of S 2252(a)(4)(B), since that clause regulates the 
purely intrastate possession of child pornography. The 
District Court denied the motion. Rodia later pled guilty, 
admitting that he knowingly possessed numerous 
photographs that constituted child pornography, including 
three Polaroid photos of naked boys in various sexually 
explicit poses. The District Court accepted his plea and 
sentenced him to a twenty-one month prison sentence, 
followed by three years of supervised release with special 
conditions. 
 
Rodia did not preserve his right to appeal by entering a 
conditional guilty plea. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). 
However, since the issue presented goes to the jurisdiction 
of the District Court, we have jurisdiction over his appeal. 
See United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 572 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1995). Our review of the statute's constitutionality is 
plenary, though we must respect Congress's ample 
discretion to determine the appropriate exercise of its 
Commerce Clause authority. See United States v. Rybar, 
103 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 1996). In engaging in this 
review, we must ascertain whether Congress "could 
rationally conclude that the regulated activity substantially 
affects interstate commerce." Id. Our inquiry is restricted to 
whether any state of facts--either facts known or facts that 
could reasonably be assumed--affords support for that 
conclusion. See Pic-A-State PA, Inc. v. Reno, 76 F.3d 1294, 
1302 (3d Cir. 1996). If such a set of facts exists, we then 
must consider whether "the means chosen by Congress are 
reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the 
Constitution." Id. (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining 
& Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)). 
 
II. The Parties' Contentions 
 
The version of 18 U.S.C. S 2252 that was in place in 
1991, when Rodia was arrested, provided in relevant part: 
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        (a) Any person who . . . (4) either . . . (B) knowingly 
       possesses 3 or more books, magazines, periodicals, 
       films, video tapes, or other matter which contain any 
       visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been 
       shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 
       commerce, or which was produced using materials 
       which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, 
       by any means including by computer, if -- . . . 
 
        (i) the producing of such visual depiction involves 
       the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
       conduct; and (ii) such visual depiction is of such 
       conduct; shall be punished as provided in subsection 
       (b) of this section. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 2252(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added). 
 
Rodia was indicted under the second clause of subsection 
(B) of the statute, which grounds jurisdiction solely on the 
fact that the materials from which the pornography was 
created were shipped in interstate commerce. This is the 
only part of the statute he challenges; he does not contest 
the constitutionality of the clause regulating pornography 
that itself has traveled in interstate commerce. Thus, when 
we discuss S 2252, we are referring only to the clause that 
prohibits the intrastate possession of child pornography 
made from materials that traveled interstate. In formulating 
his constitutional challenge, Rodia relies heavily on United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). It is therefore 
necessary to summarize that decision here. 
 
A. 
 
In Lopez, the Court struck down the Gun Free School 
Zones Act ("GFSZA") on the ground that Congress exceeded 
its Commerce Clause power in passing the Act. The GFSZA 
made it a federal offense for any individual to knowingly 
possess a firearm within a school zone. The Court described 
the three broad categories of activity that Congress may 
properly regulate--the channels of interstate commerce, the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and those 
activities that have a substantial relation to interstate 
commerce--and noted that, in light of the activity regulated 
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(gun possession), the GFSZA could be upheld, if at all, only 
if it fell into the third category. See id. at 559. 
 
In concluding that the statute was unconstitutional 
under the third category of regulation, the Court based its 
decision on two major grounds and a minor ground. Itfirst 
noted that the GFSZA, a criminal statute that had"nothing 
to do with `commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise," 
was not a "part of a larger regulation of economic activity, 
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless 
the intrastate activity were regulated." Id. at 561. Though 
the government (and four Justices in dissent) argued that 
guns in school zones result in violent crime, which harms 
the educational environment and makes for less productive 
citizens, the Court found the connection between gun 
possession on school grounds and commercial transactions 
too attenuated to say that such possession substantially 
affected interstate commerce. The Court also rejected the 
argument that the costs of crime impact the well-being of 
the nation as a whole, since it would follow from that 
argument that Congress could regulate all violent crime. 
 
Second, the Court noted that the GFSZA contained "no 
jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case- 
by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question 
affects interstate commerce." Id. at 561. The Court thus 
sought some guarantee that the behavior being regulated 
has a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce once the 
underlying facts of the case are proven. Finally, though the 
Court acknowledged that Congress is normally not required 
to make findings in order to legislate, it commented on the 
dearth of congressional findings about the effect of gun 
possession on interstate commerce, which left the Court 
unable to evaluate the reasonableness of Congress's 
judgment. See id. at 562-63. 
 
B. 
 
Rodia's argument is two-pronged. First, while 
acknowledging that S 2252 has a jurisdictional hook insofar 
as it requires that the materials from which the 
pornography has been created have traveled in interstate 
commerce, he contends that a statute cannot be upheld 
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against a Commerce Clause challenge simply because it 
contains a jurisdictional element. A jurisdictional element, 
as the term has been used in and after Lopez, refers to a 
provision in a federal statute that requires the government 
to establish specific facts justifying the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction in connection with any individual application of 
the statute. See United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460, 
1465 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 
(noting that the Gun-Free School Zones Act "has no express 
jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a 
discrete set of firearm possessions that . . . have an explicit 
connection with or effect on interstate commerce"); United 
States v. Pierson, 139 F.3d 501, 503 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting 
that a jurisdictional element expressly requires a nexus 
between the activity regulated and interstate commerce, 
thus ensuring that Congress exercised its Commerce 
Clause power to reach a discrete set of criminal acts that 
have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate 
commerce). Rodia contends that the jurisdictional element 
in S 2252(a)(4)(B) fails to ensure that the activity Congress 
wanted to regulate has an actual nexus to interstate 
commerce, since it does not require that the final product 
regulated--child pornography--traveled in interstate 
commerce. 
 
Second, Rodia submits that simple intrastate possession 
of child pornography does not fit into any of the three 
categories of interstate commerce that are proper subjects 
of congressional regulation: (i) channels of interstate 
commerce; (ii) instrumentalities of interstate commerce; 
and (iii) activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce. For the reasons explained infra Part IV and n.3, 
categories (i) and (ii) are not at issue in this case. With 
regard to the third category, he claims victory on the 
grounds that possession of child pornography is not of an 
economic or commercial nature, relying on the statute's 
legislative history in support of his claim. He emphasizes 
this point by making a classic slippery slope argument: If 
"Congress can regulate the purely intrastate activity of 
Rodia simply because the blank film traveled interstate, 
then there would be no activity beyond the power of 
Congress to regulate." Def. Br. at 6. If we uphold the 
statute, he forcefully argues, Congress could prohibit the 
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shoplifting in New Jersey of a candy bar made in 
Pennsylvania, or the rape of a person who at one time has 
traveled interstate, simply because there is a trivial 
interstate nexus to the intrastate activity being regulated. 
 
The government defends the statute on two grounds. 
First, it submits that S 2252(a)(4)(B)'s express jurisdictional 
requirement is sufficient to render the statute 
constitutional. Second, it contends that even if we deem the 
jurisdictional element insufficient to make the statute 
constitutional, Congress validly exercised its Commerce 
Clause power by attempting to suppress the intrastate 
demand for child pornography, which would in turn 
substantially affect interstate commerce by decreasing the 
demand for the interstate supply of child pornography. 
 
In support of its position, the government points out that 
the three courts to decide this question, including two 
courts of appeals, have upheld the constitutionality of the 
statute. See United States v. Bausch, 140 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 806 (1999); United States v. 
Robinson, 137 F.3d 652 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Winningham, 953 F. Supp. 1068, 1074 n.13 (D. Minn. 
1996). We turn first to the jurisdictional element. 
 
III. The Jurisdictional Element 
 
As we have noted, the government contends that the 
presence of the jurisdictional element in S 2252 is by itself 
sufficient to render the clause at issue constitutional. 
However, in United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir. 
1995), we held: 
 
       The mere presence of a jurisdictional element . . . does 
       not in and of itself insulate a statute from judicial 
       scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, or render it per 
       se constitutional. To the contrary, courts must inquire 
       further to determine whether the jurisdictional element 
       has the requisite nexus with interstate commerce. We 
       must, therefore, determine whether the jurisdictional 
       component in this case limits the statute to items that 
       have an explicit connection with, or effect upon, 
       interstate commerce. 
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Id. at 585. We went on to make that determination, 
concluding that the carjacking statute's jurisdictional 
element ensured that the car involved in the carjacking had 
an explicit connection with interstate commerce. 
 
The government refers us to three later cases that, it 
contends, establish that we need look no further than the 
jurisdictional element. In United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 
273, 285 (3d Cir. 1996), we noted in passing that the 
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Bass, 404 
U.S. 336 (1971), "merely signified that a statute's inclusion 
of a jurisdictional element is a condition sufficient to 
establish its validity under the Commerce Clause." 
However, we made this comment only in response to the 
defendant's argument that the absence of a jurisdictional 
element in Rybar was fatal to the statute involved in that 
case. Indeed, the statute at issue in Rybar contained no 
jurisdictional element, and thus this statement about the 
effect of the presence of such an element was focused on 
the issue before us and is clearly dicta.1  In contrast, our 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In addition, we believe that Rybar overstates the holding of Bass. In 
Bass, the Court had to interpret a gun possession statute, which applied 
to anyone "who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or 
affecting commerce any firearm." The government argued that "in 
commerce or affecting commerce" applied only to the verb "transports"; 
the Court rejected this reading, holding that "in commerce or affecting 
commerce" applied also to "possesses" and"receives." The Court did not 
state that a formal, jurisdictional element would be sufficient to render 
a statute constitutional. Rather, it merely enforced the underlying 
constitutional requirement that the activity regulated by federal statute 
have some demonstrated nexus with interstate commerce. A later 
Supreme Court case discussing Bass supports this reading. In 
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), the Court described 
Bass as follows: 
 
       Since "[a]bsent proof of some interstate commerce nexus in each 
       case S 1202(a) dramatically intrudes upon traditional state 
criminal 
       jurisdiction," we were unwilling to conclude, without a "clearer 
       statement of intention," that Congress meant to dispense entirely 
       with a nexus requirement in individual cases. 
 
        It was unnecessary in Bass for us to decide what would constitute 
       an adequate nexus with commerce as the Government had made no 
       attempt to show any nexus at all. 
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ruling in Bishop was directed toward the precise issue we 
address. 
 
We also believe that Bishop is sound. A hard and fast 
rule that the presence of a jurisdictional element 
automatically ensures the constitutionality of a statute 
ignores the fact that the connection between the activity 
regulated and the jurisdictional hook may be so attenuated 
as to fail to guarantee that the activity regulated has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 561 (implying that jurisdictional elements are useful 
only when they can ensure, through a case-by-case inquiry, 
that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce); 
United States v. Jones, 178 F.3d 479, 480 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(noting that the jurisdictional element of S 844(i), even if 
proven by the government, did not establish a substantial 
connection to interstate commerce; and therefore, looking 
beyond the jurisdictional element to assess the statute's 
constitutionality); United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 
522, 527 (9th Cir. 1995) (illustrating that a statutorily 
imposed requirement of a jurisdictional nexus to interstate 
commerce will not insulate the statute from judicial review). 
We discuss in the margin the other post-Bishop cases on 
which the government relies.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Id. at 568 (citations omitted). It is a big leap from Bass's specific 
holding 
--that the Court would read the statute in such a way as to ensure that 
the government had to prove a nexus between the gun at issue and 
interstate commerce--to the broad proposition that a jurisdictional 
element will always guarantee a statute's constitutionality. 
 
2. The government reads United States v. Gaydos, 108 F.3d 505, 508 (3d 
Cir. 1997), to stand for the proposition that the simple presence of a 
jurisdictional element rendered the statute at issue constitutional. 
There, 
however, the panel simply concluded that the jurisdictional element 
contained in the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C.S 844(i), ensured that 
the statute only applied to arson that substantially affected interstate 
commerce. The government also relies on United States v. Gateward, 84 
F.3d 670 (3d Cir. 1996), which further explicated Bass and Scarborough. 
However, in Gateward, we did no more than conclude that the specific 
jurisdictional element in the case adequately performed the function of 
guaranteeing the nexus between firearm possession and commerce. The 
panel stated: 
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In this case, the jurisdictional element--the requirement 
that precursor materials like film or cameras moved in 
interstate commerce--is only tenuously related to the 
ultimate activity regulated: intrastate possession of child 
pornography. A jurisdictional element is only sufficient to 
ensure a statute's constitutionality when the element either 
limits the regulation to interstate activity or ensures that 
the intrastate activity to be regulated falls within one of the 
three categories of congressional power. See Bishop, 66 
F.3d at 594 (Becker, J., dissenting); see also United States 
v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[I]n Lopez, the 
Court simply did not state or imply that all criminal 
statutes must have such an element, or that all statutes 
with such an element would be constitutional, or that any 
statute without such an element is per se 
unconstitutional."); Andrew St. Laurent, Reconstituting 
United States v. Lopez: Another Look at Federal Criminal 
Law, 31 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 61, 112 (1998) ("A 
purely nominal jurisdictional requirement, that some entity 
or object involved in the crime be drawn from interstate 
commerce, does nothing to prevent the shifting of[the 
federal/state] balance in favor of the federal government. As 
has been amply demonstrated, virtually all criminal actions 
in the United States involve the use of some object that has 
passed through interstate commerce."). 
 
As a practical matter, the limiting jurisdictional factor is 
almost useless here, since all but the most self-sufficient 
child pornographers will rely on film, cameras, or chemicals 
that traveled in interstate commerce and will therefore fall 
within the sweep of the statute. At all events, it is at least 
doubtful in this case that the jurisdictional element 
adequately performs the function of guaranteeing that the 
final product regulated substantially affects interstate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       We do not understand Lopez to undercut the Bass/Scarborough 
       proposition that the jurisdictional element [which required that 
the 
       gun have been possessed `in or affecting commerce'] keeps the felon 
       firearm law well inside the constitutional fringes of the Commerce 
       Clause. 
 
84 F.3d at 671. 
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commerce. Because we will affirm the statute on other 
grounds, we proceed to examine the nexus between 
interstate commerce and the activity regulated. 
 
IV. Does Intrastate Possession of Child Pornography Affect 
       Interstate Commerce? 
 
As discussed above, see supra Part II.A., the Supreme 
Court has identified three broad categories of activity that 
Congress can regulate using its commerce power: (i) the 
channels of interstate commerce; (ii) instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce; and (iii) those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 559. Neither of the parties argues that category (i) 
is at issue. The government contends that we should 
analyze S 2252 under categories (ii) and (iii). However, our 
description of "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce in 
Bishop makes clear that we are not confronted with the 
congressional regulation of such instrumentalities in this 
case.3 We therefore turn to category (iii) and to the heart of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In Bishop, we stated: 
 
       Instrumentalities differ from other objects that affect interstate 
       commerce because they are used as a means of transporting goods 
       and people across state lines. . . . It would be anomalous, 
therefore, 
       to recognize [trains, planes, and highways as] categories of 
       instrumentalities but to suggest that the similarly mobile 
automobile 
       is not also an instrumentality of interstate commerce. 
 
66 F.3d at 588. Though the dissent disagreed with that conclusion, it, 
too, emphasized that "courts have, to date, appropriately limited 
[category two's] application to congressional regulation of 
instrumentalities actually engaged in interstate commerce, or objects 
such as railcars . . . , which are integrally related to an interstate 
commerce network." Id. at 597 (Becker, J., dissenting); see also 
Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1943) (treating a bridge as 
an instrumentality); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) 
(interstate rail carriers); Southern R.R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 
20 
(1911) (railcars). Thus, category (ii) is inapt, and we will consider the 
statute only under category (iii), referring to the relevant inquiry in 
this 
case as whether it was reasonable for Congress to believe that the 
behavior regulated substantially affects interstate commerce. See United 
States v. Bausch, 140 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 
 
                                12 
  
the matter: whether Congress had a rational basis for 
believing that the intrastate possession of pornography has 
a substantial effect on interstate commerce. We analyze 
this question through the prism of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111 (1942), and its progeny. We also consider the 
relevance of the fact that Congress has long regulated 
interstate commerce in child pornography, and that, in 
enacting the subsection of S 2252 at issue here, Congress 
was seeking to close a loophole in that statute so as to 
better achieve its goal. After discussing "substantial effect," 
we will address the reasonableness of Congress's chosen 
means as a way to achieve its desired goals. 
 
A. 
 
There is no dispute about the veritable tautology that 
interstate trafficking in child pornography has an effect on 
interstate commerce. Nevertheless, a brief summary of the 
legislative history of S 2252, in which congressional findings 
explicated the role of child pornography in interstate 
commerce, offers an important background to the ultimate 
issue we must decide: whether Congress could have 
believed that the intrastate possession of pornography 
substantially affects interstate commerce. With a clear 
understanding of the role child pornography plays in 
interstate commerce, it is easier to comprehend both 
Congress's efforts to regulate the industry and its 
subsequent attempt in 1990 to close a loophole in those 
regulations by enacting the clause of S 2252 that is at issue 
here. We discuss these findings even though they were not 
made in direct support of the 1990 amendments, for 
reasons set forth in the margin.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
806 (1999) (same); United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652 (1st Cir. 
1998) (analyzing and upholding constitutionality ofS 2252 under 
category (iii)); but see United States v. Winningham, 953 F. Supp. 1068, 
1074 n.13 (D. Minn. 1996) (finding S 2252 constitutional under category 
(ii)). 
 
4. Despite the fact that the findings contained in the extensive 
legislative 
history of the statute were not made in relation to the 1990 amendments 
to S 2252, we think that, under Supreme Court and Third Circuit 
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In 1978, the Senate Report accompanying the passage of 
the original Protection of Children Against Sexual 
Exploitation Act (the precursor to the CRPA) stated: 
 
       There is a substantial amount of trafficking in the 
       United States today in pornographic materials [of 
       children] . . . . The hearings and staff investigations 
       . . . have led us to the following conclusions: that child 
       pornography and child prostitution have become highly 
       organized, multimillion dollar industries that operate 
       on a nationwide scale [and] that such prostitution and 
       the sale and distribution of such pornographic 
       materials are carried on to a substantial extent 
       through the mails and other instrumentalities of 
       interstate and foreign commerce. 
 
S. Rep. No. 95-438, at ___ (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 70, ___. A 1986 amendment to the Act 
included legislative findings that stated: "[C]hild 
exploitation has become a multi-million dollar industry, 
infiltrated and operated by elements of organized crime, 
and by a nationwide network of individuals openly 
advertising their desire to exploit children." Pub. L. No. 99- 
591, 100 Stat. 3341-74 (1986). A 1988 amendment, which 
broadened S 2252(a)(1) to encompass the transmission by 
computer of child pornography in interstate commerce, 
highlights the fact that child pornography had begun to 
travel in interstate commerce by yet another means, 
emphasizing the increasingly commercial nature of child 
pornography. 
 
Congress's conclusion that a substantial interstate 
market in child pornography exists seems an eminently 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
precedent, we should consider these congressionalfindings as we review 
the statute's constitutionality. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 190 
n.12 (1968) (holding that where Congress had earlier passed related 
legislation with relevant findings, subsequent legislation was 
"presumably based on similar findings and purposes with respect to the 
areas newly covered"); Rybar, 103 F.3d at 279-81 (considering legislative 
history unrelated to the specific provision at issue in that case and 
relying on the "history of the legislative history" of federal gun control 
to 
illustrate the link between the behavior regulated and its effect on 
commerce). 
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reasonable one. But since the statutory subsection at issue 
in this case regulates purely intrastate possession of child 
pornography, we must explore the relationship between 
intrastate possession of child pornography and interstate 
commerce in child pornography. 
 
B. 
 
In the wake of the Interstate Commerce Act and the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, which ushered in a new era of 
federal regulation, the Supreme Court subjected laws 
passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause to a 
"direct/indirect" test, which allowed Congress only to 
regulate activities that directly affected interstate 
commerce. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935). However, it soon became 
apparent that, if the Commerce Clause were read to forbid 
Congress from regulating anything but those goods that 
actually traveled (and those commercial activities that 
actually took place) between states, Congress's attempts to 
regulate interstate commerce would be severely hindered 
because some local activities or goods are so intertwined 
with interstate commerce that it is necessary to control the 
local behavior to ensure the efficacy of interstate regulation. 
See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 
(1937). 
 
In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court confronted this 
problem head on. Filburn, a farmer, sought a declaration 
that the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which imposed 
penalties on crops produced in excess of the Act's quotas, 
was unconstitutional. Filburn alleged that Congress had 
exceeded its Commerce Clause power in enacting a statute 
that extended federal regulation to wheat production that 
was intended not for commerce but only for personal 
consumption on his farm. See 317 U.S. at 118. The Court 
held that Congress had the authority to regulate singular 
instances of intrastate activity when such events, taken in 
the aggregate, might ultimately have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce. See id. at 125 ("[E]ven if appellee's 
activity be local and though it may not be regarded as 
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by 
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Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce."); see also Rybar, 103 F.3d at 283. 
 
Since that time, the Court has repeatedly affirmed that 
the Commerce power extends to 
 
       those activities intrastate which so affect interstate 
       commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress 
       over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate 
       means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the 
       effective execution of the granted power to regulate 
       interstate commerce. 
 
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 277 (quoting United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)). Lopez 
teaches, however, that the Wickard line of cases "may not 
be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate 
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in 
view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the 
distinction between what is national and what is local and 
create a completely centralized government." Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 556-57. 
 
In Rybar, we relied on Wickard's reasoning to reject a 
Commerce Clause challenge to 18 U.S.C. S 922(o), which 
makes it unlawful "for any person to transfer or possess a 
machinegun." The defendant, a machine gun owner, argued 
that the statute failed the "substantially affects" test, since 
it governed purely intrastate possession of machine guns. 
See Rybar, 103 F.3d at 277-78. After reviewing the 
legislative history of gun control, we concluded that 
Congress might well have contemplated that the regulated 
activity of machine gun possession, when occurring in the 
aggregate, substantially affected commerce, and that by 
instituting a "demand-side measure to lessen the stimulus 
that prospective acquisition would have on the commerce in 
machine guns," Congress did not exceed the limits of the 
Commerce Clause. Id. at 283. 
 
In other words, it was permissible for Congress to 
attempt to reduce the demand for machine guns, even by 
regulating purely intrastate behavior, because the effect of 
that reduction in intrastate demand might well be to limit 
the flow of those weapons into states, thus reducing the 
interstate commerce in those weapons. See also United 
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States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that S 922(o) "is a reasonable measure for 
choking off the traffic in machine guns, which may be 
constricted on the supply side through prohibition of 
transfers as well as on the demand side by criminalizing 
possession"). We acknowledged a similar principle in 
Bishop, where we stated, "[I]f a criminal activity is rationally 
believed to be one of the conduits of a nationwide and 
international pipeline of illegal activity, Congress may 
justifiably step in and regulate that activity although it is 
wholly intrastate." 66 F.3d at 585. Even more to the point 
is Robinson, a case factually indistinguishable from Rodia's, 
where the First Circuit considered market demands when it 
held: 
 
       By outlawing the purely intrastate possession of child 
       pornography in S 2252(a)(4)(B), Congress can curb the 
       nationwide demand for these materials. We believe that 
       such possession, "through repetition elsewhere," helps 
       to create and sustain a market for sexually explicit 
       materials depicting minors. 
 
137 F.3d at 656 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567). 
 
C. 
 
There is a subtle transformation at work here. In 
Wickard, the goods at issue--the wheat produced and 
consumed by the farmer--were being substituted for the 
interstate wheat that the statute attempted to regulate. The 
supply and demand analysis there, which resulted in the 
conclusion that intrastate growing of wheat had a 
substantial effect on the interstate market in wheat, 
required few assumptions: home-grown wheat acts as a 
direct substitute for wheat purchased in commerce, 
including interstate commerce. However, as the cases just 
cited indicate, courts often have adopted Wickard's generic 
principle--that intrastate activity, if repeated, may 
substantially affect interstate commerce--in situations that 
are economically distinct from Wickard and that require a 
greater number of assumptions before the connection 
between intrastate and interstate activity becomes clear. 
For instance, many courts have applied the Wickard 
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principle to criminal statutes, concluding that suppressing 
the intrastate demand for a good (for example, by 
criminalizing possession of guns or drugs) would have a 
substantial impact on interstate commerce by affecting the 
supply of that good. See Franklyn, 157 F.3d at 96; Proyect 
v. United States, 101 F.3d 11, 13-14 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Bishop, 66 F.3d at 584-85. 
 
In many cases, this will be a reasonable assumption. We 
note, however, that the latter economic model is different 
from Wickard's substitution analysis, a fact that many 
courts have glossed over. In addition, a number of courts 
have applied Wickard's aggregation concept to all activities, 
economic and non-economic, without acknowledging"that 
Lopez approvingly discussed the aggregation principle only 
in conjunction with economic activity." United States v. 
Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) 
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, while there 
may not be a precise analytical fit between substitution 
situations like Wickard and supply-affecting situations like 
the one at issue here, the weight of authority has assumed 
that Wickard's generic principle may be applied across 
economic frameworks, to both criminal and civil 
regulations, so long as there is a strong nexus between the 
intrastate and interstate activity. We so reasoned in Rybar, 
and will do the same here. 
 
D. 
 
In this case, we think that Congress could have rationally 
reasoned as follows: Some pornographers manufacture, 
possess, and use child pornography exclusively within the 
boundaries of a state, and often only within the boundaries 
of their own property. It is unrealistic to think that those 
pornographers will be content with their own supply, hence 
they will likely wish to explore new or additional 
pornographic photographs of children. Many of those 
pornographers will look to the interstate market as a source 
of new material, whether through mail order catalogs or 
through the Internet. Therefore, the possession of 
"homegrown" pornography may well stimulate a further 
interest in pornography that immediately or eventually 
animates demand for interstate pornography. It is also 
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reasonable to believe the related proposition that 
discouraging the intrastate possession of pornography will 
cause some of these child pornographers to leave the realm 
of child pornography completely, which in turn will reduce 
the interstate demand for pornography.5  
 
Another way to describe the nexus between intrastate 
and interstate activity here is in terms of the notion of 
addiction, which is explicated in the legislative history 
accompanying the 1996 amendments to S 2252. 6 The 
Senate Report stated that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Congress also reasonably could have believed that the clause at issue 
would affect the supply side of the child pornography market. Congress 
found that many producers of child pornography shipped their end 
product interstate. See S. Rep. No. 95-438, at ___ (1977), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 70, ___ (finding that child pornography had become a 
highly organized, multimillion dollar industry that operated on a 
nationwide scale and that the sale and distribution of such pornographic 
materials were carried on to a substantial extent through the mails and 
other instrumentalities of interstate commerce). Given that conclusion, 
Congress could have believed that before the 1990 amendments, 
commercial manufacturers of pornography were insufficiently deterred 
from making and then selling their products interstate, since the only 
stage at which their operation was illegal was at the selling stage. By 
making it illegal to possess pornography manufactured from materials 
that passed interstate, even when the pornography itself had not passed 
interstate, Congress made it easier for law enforcement officials to stem 
the flow of manufactured--but not yet distributed--pornography, thus 
curbing the supply of child pornography at its source, before it was 
released into the interstate market. While this rationale supports the 
purpose behind S 2252(a)(4)(B), we do not rely on it because such 
manufacturers are covered by another part of S 2252--to wit, 
S 2252(a)(3)(B), which makes it illegal knowingly to sell or to possess 
with 
intent to sell child pornography that has passed in interstate commerce 
or that has been produced using materials that have traveled in 
interstate commerce. We mention this to illustrate that demand-side 
measures often have supply-side effects as well. 
 
6. As we discussed supra n.4, we will consider legislative history 
relating 
to S 2252, even if that history was not developed for the specific 
amendment to the statute at issue here. Though the use of subsequent 
legislative history is often disfavored as a method of determining an 
earlier Congress's legislative intent, see Chapman v. United States, 500 
U.S. 453, 464 n.4 (1991), courts have occasionally found such legislative 
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       prohibiting the possession and viewing of child 
       pornography will encourage the possessors of such 
       material to rid themselves of or destroy the material, 
       thereby helping to protect the victims of child 
       pornography and to eliminate the market for the sexual 
       exploitative use of children. 
 
S. Rep. No. 104-358, at ___ (1996), reprinted at 1996 WL 
506545. That report further explained the addictive nature 
of pornography: "[P]ornography `is an addiction that 
escalates, requiring more graphic or violent material for 
arousal.' . . . [T]he use of child pornography in time 
desensitizes the viewer . . . [and the user] escalates to more 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
history useful. See Sykes v. Columbus & Greenville Ry., 117 F.3d 287, 
293-94 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Although a committee report written with regard 
to a subsequent enactment is not legislative history with regard to a 
previously enacted statute, it is entitled to some consideration as a 
secondarily authoritative expression of expert opinion."); see also 
Strickland v. Commissioner, Maine Dep't of Human Servs., 48 F.3d 12, 18 
(1st Cir. 1995) ("We conclude that the value, if any, of such post- 
enactment materials should be decided case by case."). Where, as here, 
Congress's subsequent fact-finding supplements, rather than conflicts 
with, its earlier statements; where we are not using later congressional 
statements as a way to interpret earlier language but rather as evidence 
of the kind of research the 1990 Congress had before it; and where the 
later fact-finding was made as part of an overall explanation of the 
purpose behind the statute rather than in reference to one particular 
subsection thereof, we think that subsequent fact-finding can be 
considered, though not given a large role, in the rational basis 
determination. 
 
Even if we chose not to consider the subsequent history in our 
analysis of what facts Congress had before it in 1990, the subsequent 
history would be material for a quite different reason. To the extent that 
the 1996 legislative history sets out a rational explanation for why 
Congress might have believed that restricting intrastate pornography 
made from interstate materials would diminish the demand for interstate 
pornography, we may consider the statement not as subsequent 
legislative history but merely as evidence that there could be a rational 
basis for this belief. See Pic-A-State PA, Inc. v. Reno, 76 F.3d 1294, 
1302 
(3d Cir. 1996) (noting that in Commerce Clause challenges, the court's 
inquiry "must be restricted to the issue of whether any state of facts 
either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for 
it"). 
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deviant material." Id. at ___ (noting also that "the existence 
of and traffic in child pornographic images . . . inflames the 
desires of . . . child pornographers who prey on children, 
thereby increasing the creation and distribution of child 
pornography and the sexual abuse and exploitation of 
actual children who are victimized as a result of the 
existence and use of these materials"). 
 
We think that this common sense understanding of the 
demand-side forces we have described supra helps to 
demonstrate the strong nexus between the intrastate 
possession of and the interstate market in child 
pornography.7 We believe that this nexus provides a 
limiting principle of the type sought in Lopez , see 514 U.S. 
at 556-57, 564-65, for the nexus present here will not be 
present in criminal regulations that attempt to limit or ban 
behavior that does not involve an exchange of goods, such 
as murder or assault. This limit is particularly important in 
the criminal context, which is an area that traditionally has 
been regulated by the states. For these reasons, we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See also United States v. Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 1997), 
decided in the context of the Youth Handgun Safety Act ("YHSA"), which 
prohibits the intrastate sale, transfer, delivery, and possession of 
handguns to and by juveniles, where the Court of Appeals noted: 
 
       [W]e think the possessory prong of the YHSA . . . is `an essential 
       part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the 
       regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity 
       were regulated.' This is so because the YHSA was designed expressly 
       to `stop[ ] the commerce in handguns with juveniles nationwide. . . 
.' 
       Part of this regulatory approach involves the suppression of the 
       demand for such handguns. The YHSA can be thus seen as 
       criminalization of the two points where the prohibited commerce 
       finds its nexus; the demand for the firearms (possession), and the 
       sale or transfer designed to meet that demand. The two prohibitions 
       go hand in hand with one another. Invalidation of one half of the 
       equation would likely have deleterious effects on the efficacy of 
the 
       legislation. 
 
(citations omitted) (alteration in original); see also United States v. 
Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 890 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Permitting unregulated 
intrastate possessions and transfers of machine guns. . . indirectly 
undermines, via a market theory, the effectiveness of the federal attempt 
to regulate interstate commerce in machine guns."). 
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conclude that Congress rationally could have believed that 
child pornography that did not itself travel in interstate 
commerce has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, 
and is thus a valid subject of regulation under the 
Commerce Clause. 
 
E. 
 
We do not believe that the conclusion just reached 
supports the broad proposition that, since intrastate 
possession of a good so often has a substantial effect on the 
interstate market in the same good, Congress is effectively 
entitled to regulate any intrastate activity involving a good 
when there is a larger interstate market for it. The presence 
of two additional factors limits our holding. First, because 
the problem of child pornography is one that has been 
addressed by federal statutes for over twenty years, 
S 2252(a)(4)(B) does not constitute a "sharp break" in the 
pattern of federal legislation of the kind that troubled the 
Court in Lopez. See 514 U.S. at 563. 
 
In addition, as we demonstrate below the subsection of 
S 2252(a)(4)(B) at issue here, which serves to close a 
loophole left open by the original statute, plays a critical 
role in maintaining the effectiveness of the overall statutory 
scheme, a factor that was absent in Lopez. See Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 561 (noting that "S 922(q) is not an essential part of 
a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the 
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate 
activity were regulated"); see also Pic-A-State, 76 F.3d at 
1302-03 (holding that Congress could have concluded that 
the [Interstate Wage] amendment at issue was necessary to 
effectuate the purposes of the original act, since the 
amendment closed an unforeseen loophole in that act). In 
the case of child pornography, Congress has long regulated 
interstate commerce in child pornography as a way to 
abolish child pornography entirely, and the subsection of 
the statute at issue here was added in 1990 because the 
effectiveness of that regulatory scheme was being undercut 
by the child pornographers who continued to manufacture 
their own pornography intrastate. 
 
Specifically, it may be difficult to ascertain whether 
pornography found in an individual's home was produced 
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by that individual, acquired from a friend intrastate, or 
purchased in interstate commerce. Like controlled 
substances, and unlike weapons that carry identifying 
numbers, pornography may often be fungible. To the extent 
that one piece of child pornography is fungible with 
another, federal efforts to arrest users of pornography will 
be hindered by an inability to determine whether a 
particular piece of pornography has traveled interstate or 
not. That is, child pornography cannot be effectively 
regulated without federal control over both the interstate 
and local versions of the activity. In our view, this loophole- 
closing purpose illuminates and supports the congressional 
perception of the probable effect of intrastate pornography 
possession on the demand for interstate child pornography. 
However, before finalizing our conclusions on the issue, we 
must address Rodia's argument that intrastate possession 
of pornography is a non-commercial activity. 
 
F. 
 
In support of his argument that S 2252 is 
unconstitutional, Rodia points out that several pieces of the 
statute's legislative history acknowledge that most child 
pornographers do not possess pornography for commercial 
purposes, and that, as with the GFSZA invalidated in 
Lopez, Congress therefore is attempting to regulate an 
activity that has no relation to commerce. 
 
First, he invokes the 1984 amendments to the statute, 
which, in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in New 
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding that child 
pornography is entitled to no First Amendment protection), 
eliminated the requirement that the child pornography have 
been created "for the purpose of sale or distribution for 
sale." The House Report noted: 
 
       Many of the individuals who distribute materials 
       covered by 18 U.S.C. 2252 do so by gift or exchange 
       without any commercial motive and thus remain 
       outside the coverage of this provision. . . . Since the 
       harm to the child exists whether or not those who 
       initiate or carry out the schemes are motivated by 
       profit, the subcommittee found a need to expand the 
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       coverage of the act by deleting the commercial purpose 
       requirement. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 98-536, ___ (1983), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, ___. Second, the 1986 legislative history 
detailed that this change was made because "experience 
revealed that much if not most child pornography material 
is distributed through an underground network of 
pedophiles who exchange the material on a non-commercial 
basis." H.R. Rep. No. 99-910, at ___ (1986), reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5952, ____. Third, the Justice 
Department comments included in House Report 536 state: 
 
       Utilization of 18 U.S.C. 2252 has been inhibited by the 
       fact that the statute covers the distribution of child 
       pornography only for commercial purposes. It is a fact, 
       however, that many, perhaps even most, of the 
       individuals who distribute materials covered by 18 
       U.S.C. 2252 do so by trade or exchange, without any 
       commercial purpose and thereby avoid violating this 
       provision. . . . Nevertheless, the harm to children 
       involved in child pornography schemes exists whether 
       or not those who initiate or carry out these schemes 
       have a profit motive or commercial purpose. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 98-536, at ___ (1983), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 502. 
 
These findings illustrate that not all child pornographers 
produce pornography with the intent that it enter the 
stream of commerce. Nevertheless, such congressional 
findings do not foreclose a conclusion that intrastate 
possession of pornography affects interstate commerce. 
Congress's findings that some child pornography is 
noncommercial do not undermine its findings that child 
pornography is a multimillion dollar, nationwide industry. 
Rather, the former findings merely highlight that many 
people participate in the industry, and that a large number 
of those involved are independent operators who create 
child pornography for their own use and, perhaps, the use 
of their acquaintances. Where, as here, a class of activities 
is regulated (the shipment or exchange of child 
pornography) and the class is within the reach of federal 
power, we cannot rely on the fact that some of the class is 
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engaged in non-commercial activity to invalidate the entire 
statute. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 
(1971) (noting that where Congress is appropriately 
regulating a class of activities, the courts have no power to 
excise, as trivial, individual instances of the class). 
 
Moreover, as we noted in Bishop, Congress is not 
foreclosed from regulating an activity with links to 
interstate commerce even though some people engaging in 
that activity may not have a commercial motive. In Bishop, 
we explained, "While the [Department of Justice] report 
notes that economic gain is not the only or even the 
principal motive behind carjacking, the fact that additional 
motives exist is not relevant to our inquiry." 66 F.3d at 582 
n.18. Indeed, Wickard embodies this principle since the 
wheat at issue there had been grown for personal 
consumption, not for sale; as discussed above, the Court 
upheld the statute, finding the intent of the wheat grower 
irrelevant. See 317 U.S. at 118 (upholding the statute even 
though it extended federal regulation "to [wheat] production 
not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for 
consumption on the farm"). More recently, in discussing 
what "affects interstate commerce" means in the RICO 
context, the Court noted, "An enterprise surely can have a 
detrimental influence on interstate or foreign commerce 
without having its own profit-seeking motives." National 
Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 258 (1994). 
 
Finally, many cases from this and other courts of appeals 
have made clear that the specific activity that Congress is 
regulating need not itself be objectively commercial, as long 
as it has a substantial effect on commerce. See Bishop, 66 
F.3d at 581 (noting that Congress could have believed that 
it had to regulate carjacking, "whether or not it was strictly 
`commercial' or `economic,' " as one aspect of its response to 
the national commercial problem of criminal auto theft); see 
also National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 
1041, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("A class of activities can 
substantially affect interstate commerce regardless of 
whether the activity at issue--in this case the taking of 
endangered species--is commercial or noncommercial."), 
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998); United States v. 
Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1031 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that 
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the Court consistently has interpreted the Commerce 
Clause "to include transactions that might strike a lay 
person as `noncommercial' "). 
 
Therefore, the fact that a substantial portion of child 
pornographers possess pornography for non-commercial 
purposes does not automatically place the activity outside 
the realm of congressional regulation, especially since the 
activity has an obvious commercial element as well. 
 
V. Rationality of the Means-Ends Connection 
 
The final step in our inquiry is to determine whether the 
means chosen by Congress are reasonably adapted to the 
ends permitted by the Constitution. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 
276. We believe that there is a rational connection between 
the regulatory means (punishing the intrastate possession 
of child pornography) and the asserted ends (prohibiting 
interstate commerce in child pornography and reducing the 
inevitable harm to children that stems from their 
involvement in child pornography). See, e.g., United States 
v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that 
prohibiting possession of machine guns was reasonable 
means of freezing, and ultimately eliminating, the largely 
interstate market for them); United States v. Cardoza, 129 
F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding that Congress's decision 
to punish both the supply (sale or transfer) and demand 
(possession) sides of the handgun market was a means 
reasonably calculated to achieve its end). 
 
This is so even though Congress's means were not crafted 
with ultimate precision. Before S 2252 was amended to 
include the subsection at issue here, it was costly for 
pornographers to traffic in pornography across state lines, 
though it was costless (at least under federal law) to 
manufacture and use pornography intrastate. Section 
2252(a)(4)(B) made it as costly to engage in the latter 
activity as in the former. Congress's amendment thus 
would likely have had two effects. First, some 
pornographers would decide that the costs of continuing to 
make and possess child pornography were too high, and 
those pornographers would leave the industry entirely--a 
result Congress clearly intended. Second, a reasonable 
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pornographer might conclude that, after the enactment of 
S 2252(a)(4)(B), he had no incentive to continue to act 
purely intrastate, since he was committing a crime whether 
he made or used pornography that had passed interstate or 
that had remained intrastate. Thus, some "homegrown" 
pornographers might have turned to the interstate market, 
increasing the interstate demand for child pornography. 
 
We are troubled by the lack of express Congressional 
findings about the effect of intrastate possession of child 
pornography on interstate commerce. We acknowledge, 
however, that 
 
       [o]ur ability to imagine ways of redesigning the statute 
       to advance one of Congress' ends does not render it 
       irrational. . . . The history of congressional attempts to 
       address the problem . . . provides sufficient reason to 
       defer to the legislative judgment that [the statute in 
       question] is an appropriate answer. 
 
Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 19 
(1990) (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 
U.S. 456, 469 (1981)). More importantly, we are satisfied-- 
in view of the teachings of Wickard's progeny, buttressed by 
the fact that Congress has long legislated in this area and 
was conscious of the need to close a loophole in a statute 
governing interstate commerce--that S 2252(a)(4)(B) was a 
reasonable exercise of Congress's power under the 
Commerce Clause. The judgment of the District Court will 
be affirmed. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I write separately because, although I agree with the 
majority that we should affirm Rodia's conviction, I do not 
agree with the separate analysis which the majority gives 
(1) to the jurisdictional element in Part III of its opinion and 
(2) to the effect of child pornography on interstate 
commerce in Part IV. I believe that both issues should be 
considered together. Their interrelationship is helpful in 
determining the constitutionality of the statute. 
 
I do accept the majority's conclusion that the fact that a 
statute has a jurisdictional element may not be sufficient in 
and of itself to establish the statute's constitutionality. 
When, however, we are presented with a statute, such as 
the present one, which has been repeatedly held to cover 
conduct that affects interstate commerce, we must keep the 
previous history in mind when we examine the 
jurisdictional element of an amendment to the statute. 
 
We are not in the present case plowing new ground, as 
was the situation in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
563 (1995), where there were no congressional findings that 
the possession of guns in a school zone substantially 
affected interstate commerce. Id. Here, we do have 
legislative findings to aid judicial evaluation of the effect of 
child pornography on interstate commerce. Cf. United 
States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 279 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(determining that "there are legislative findings to aid 
judicial evaluation of the effect of machine guns on 
interstate commerce.") 
 
As the majority points out in Part IV, legislative history 
concerning predecessor and successor child pornography 
statutes supports the reasonableness of Congress's 
determination that a nexus exists between child 
pornography and interstate commerce. Because we have 
such a history, the jurisdictional element of S 2252(a)(4)(B) 
should be examined with that history in mind. These 
legislative findings are relevant not only to the majority's 
analysis in Part IV of the effect of child pornography on 
interstate commerce. They are also relevant to the 
evaluation of the jurisdictional element in Part III because 
that jurisdictional element is directed at the same evil as 
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the other provisions of the statute -- interstate trafficking 
in child pornography. I would defer to Congress's judgment 
that the regulation of materials, such as blank Polaroid film,1 
that have been in the stream of interstate commerce, is 
integral to its ability to regulate the interstate trafficking in 
child pornography -- even in an instance when thatfilm is 
used to create child pornography that is possessed 
intrastate. 
 
For the above reasons, in the context of the present case, 
I do not agree with the statement of the majority that "[a] 
jurisdictional element is only sufficient to ensure a statute's 
constitutionality when the element either limits the 
regulation to interstate activity or ensures that the 
intrastate activity to be regulated falls within one of the 
three categories of congressional power. Slip Op. at 11." I 
believe the above statement is too limited. We cannot 
examine the jurisdictional element in isolation. An 
additional factor in the analysis of whether the jurisdiction 
element limits the regulation to interstate activity must be 
the nature of the underlying activity, here child 
pornography, and prior determinations of the effect that the 
activity in question has on interstate commerce. 
 
As I have described above, I believe that the jurisdictional 
element here does limit the regulation to activity affecting 
interstate commerce because legislative findings have 
established the connection between child pornography and 
interstate commerce; the further requirement that the 
material on which the pornography was produced have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The essential components of child pornography are film and video. 
Without these basic components, pornographic images of children-- 
which even Rodia concedes Congress may regulate under the Commerce 
Clause if transported interstate--could not be created. Moreover, instant 
film, such as the Polaroid film at issue in this case, is particularly 
important to both possessors and manufacturers of pornography; 
commercial processing of pornographic images places the creator of the 
pornography in great jeopardy of being reported to authorities by 
commercial developers. Thus, while Polaroid film may seem a relatively 
odd commodity for the federal government to regulate, the onus for this 
anomaly lies upon those who manufacture and possess child 
pornography. 
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moved in interstate commerce will be proved on a case by 
case basis. 
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